国际紧急经济权力法(IEEPA)的历史和争议

本报告根据Congressional Research Service (CRS) 于2022年3月25日发布的《The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use》全文翻译

前言

《国际紧急经济权力法》（The International Emergency Economic Powers Act，以下简称“ IEEPA”）授予了总统广泛的权力，在宣布国家进入紧急状态后有权对各种经济交易进行管制。IEEPA与衍生它的《对敌贸易法》（Trading With the Enemy Act，以下简称“ TWEA”）一样，是现代美国制裁制度的核心。自1977年该法颁布以来，该法授予总统在宣布国家进入紧急状态后拥有广泛的经济交易管制权力，而总统在援引IEEPA授予的权力方面的变化则引起了民众对该法的监督条款是否足够有力的质疑。

在二十世纪期间，国会通过立法向总统授予了越来越多的紧急权力。TWEA就是这样一部法规。国会于1917年通过了TWEA，以规范美国加入第一次世界大战后（战争期间）与敌国的国际商业行为。国会在20世纪30年代扩大了该法律的适用范围，允许总统在和平时期（非战争期间）通过宣布国家进入紧急状态后，同时对国内和国际交易行使全部的权力。从1945年到70年代初，TWEA成为美国冷战战略中实施制裁的核心手段。总统们利用TWEA阻止国际金融交易、扣押外国国民持有的美国资产、限制出口、修改行政法规以阻止囤积黄金、限制外国对美国公司的直接投资、并对出口至美国的所有产品征收关税。

在调查委员会发现美国不断处于紧急状态超过40年之后，国会于1976年通过了《国家紧急状态法》（National Emergencies Act，以下简称“NEA”），并于1977年通过了IEEPA，对原TWEA第5(b)条项下的金融管制进行规范。这两部法律对总统的紧急权力施加了新的限制。两者都包括向国会提交报告的要求，以增加透明度和跟踪成本，而且NEA要求总统每年评估并酌情延长紧急状态。然而，一些专家认为，延长的程序已经形式化。NEA还为国会提供了终止国家紧急状态的手段，即由参议院和众议院各通过一项共同决议来终止。然而，最高法院在一个具有里程碑意义的案件中做出的裁决认为，使用共同决议来终止作为行政行为的紧急状态是违宪的。此后，国会相应修改了NEA，要求通过联合决议的形式终止紧急状态才能合宪，明显提高了终止紧急状态的门槛。

与TWEA一样，IEEPA自颁布以来已成为实施经济制裁的重要手段；与TWEA一样，总统们经常使用IEEPA来限制各种国际交易；与TWEA一样，限制的对象、使用的频率和紧急状态的持续时间都随着时间的推移而扩大。起初，总统们仅针对外国或其政府。然而，多年来，总统们越来越多地援引IEEPA来针对非国家或政府的个人和团体，如恐怖分子、从事恶意网络活动的人、以及被国际刑事法院指定的人。

截至2022年3月25日，总统们已经宣布了67次援引IEEPA的国家紧急状态，其中37次仍在进行。历史表明，援引IEEPA的国家紧急状态往往持续近十年，并且有些紧急状态持续的时间更长——根据NEA和IEEPA宣布的第一个紧急状态，是为了应对1979年伊朗劫持美国大使馆工作人员作为人质而宣布的，现在已进入第五个十年。

IEEPA赋予了总统对经济交易的广泛管制权力。尽管有这些广泛的权力，国会却从来没有试图终止总统援引IEEPA的国家紧急状态。相反，国会已多次指示总统使用IEEPA的权力来实施制裁。国会可能是考虑到IEEPA是否适当地平衡了在危机时期迅速采取行动的需要和国会监督行政行为的责任；国会也可能是考虑到IEEPA在实施其对美国外交政策和国家安全决策的影响方面的作用。

概述

在整个二十世纪，行政自由裁量权的问题一直是西方国家宪法辩论的中心。具体而言，如何平衡对法治的承诺与现代政治和经济危机的紧迫性，一直是美国和世界各地的立法者和学者们所关注的问题。¹

美国宪法并无关于宣布国家进入紧急状态的相关规定。因此，在过去的两个世纪里，国会和总统以各种不同的、往往是临时性的方式回答了这个问题。在十八和十九世纪，答案往往是总统在危机时刻明知有被弹劾和负个人民事责任的风险而未经国会批准采取行动。²国会声称对紧急行动具有优先权，并在随后决定通过立法批准总统的行动，或对总统的任何民事责任进行豁免。³

到了二十世纪，一种新的模式开始出现。国会直接颁布法律授权总统宣布紧急状态，而不是追溯性地认定行政部门在紧急状态下的特别行动。⁴扩大对行政部门的紧急权力授权，以及行政部门通过紧急权力进行管理的增加，是二十世纪西方国家的一个共同轨迹。⁵随着技术创新加快了社会变革和全球危机的步伐，一些立法机构感到不得不将权力下放给行政机构，而传统的政治理论家认为行政人员可以比更加慎重和面向未来的立法机构更加“迅速”地运作。⁶这种现象到底是颠覆了法治，还是健康的现代宪法秩序的一个标准特征，一直是一个被争论的话题。⁷

IEEPA是20世纪紧急权力授权的一个例子。⁸作为NEA ⁹框架下的117项紧急法律之一，IEEPA授予总统广泛的权力，在国家紧急状态下对各种经济交易进行管制。国会于1977年颁布了IEEPA，以限制其根据TWEA授权给总统的紧急经济权力。不过，一些学者认为，IEEPA颁布后的司法和立法行动，使其像TWEA一样，却成为经济领域中广泛和不受制约的行政权力的来源。¹⁰然而，其他学者认为，IEEPA是一个有用的工具，总统可以迅速执行国会的意图，无论是法律指示还是国会的默许。¹¹

直到最近，国会几乎都没有讨论过要修改IEEPA或NEA框架的问题。然而，总统最近的行动引起了人们对NEA框架下的总统紧急权力的关注，其中IEEPA是最经常使用的。

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Note：

1. Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1948); Edward Corwin, Total War and the Constitution (New York: Knopf, 1963). Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

2.  Such an answer can be traced to, among others, John Locke, whose political theory was central to the development of American political institutions. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Thomas Hollis (London: A. Millar et al., 1764), pp. 340-341: “This power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogative […].”

3.  Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism,” Yale Law Journal 98, no. 7 (May 1989), pp. 1392-1398; John Fabian Witt, “A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism,” Law and History Review 36, no. 3 (August 2018); George M. Dennison, “Martial Law: The Development of a Theory of Emergency Powers, 1776-1861,” The American Journal of Legal History 18, no. 1 (January 1974); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Imperial from the Beginning: The Constitution of the Original Executive (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), pp. 208-210; Matthew Warshauer, Andrew Jackson and the Politics of Martial Law (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2006). As Thomas Jefferson wrote, an executive officer acting illegally for what he determines to be the good of the country “does indeed risk himself on the justice of the controlling powers of the constitution, and his station makes it his duty to incur that risk.” Qtd. in Prakash, Imperial from the Beginning, p. 214.

4.  U.S. Congress, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., July 1974 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), pp. 40-41.

5.  For scholarship on this general trend, see, e.g., William E. Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds, Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Peter L. Lindseth, “The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s,” Yale Law Journal 113, no. 7 (May 2004); Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism”; Mary L. Dudziak, War-Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Corwin, Total War and the Constitution; Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship.

6.  Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time, ch. 2; See, e.g., Carl Schmitt, “The Plight of European Jurisprudence,” tr. G. L. Ulmen, Telos 83 (Spring 1990); John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, pp. 340-341: “[…] since in some governments the lawmaking power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution; and because also it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all accidents and necessities that may concern the public, or to make such laws as will do no harm, if they are executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons that may come in their way; therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe.”

7.  For arguments that emergency government subverts the rule of law, see, e.g., Sanford Levinson, “Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency,” Georgia Law Review 40, no. 3 (Spring 2006); Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). For arguments that states of emergency can be a standard feature of healthy modern constitutional orders or that they can reflect or anticipate the preferences of the legislature, see, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, “Small Emergencies,” Georgia Law Review 40, no. 3 (Spring 2006), p. 836; Carey and Shugart, Executive Decree Authority, p. 3.

8.  International Emergency Economic Powers Act, P.L. 95-223 (October 28, 1977), 91 Stat. 1626, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq. (2018) (IEEPA).

9.  National Emergencies Act, P.L. 94-412 (September 14, 1976), 90 Stat. 1255, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1601 et seq. (2018) (NEA); CRS Report R46379, Emergency Authorities Under the National Emergencies Act, Stafford Act, and Public Health Service Act, coordinated by Jennifer K. Elsea.

10.  See, e.g., Patrick Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime,” Michigan Journal of Law Reform 46, no. 2 (2013), pp. 757-759; “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt to Control Presidential Emergency Power,” Harvard Law Review 96, no. 5 (March 1983), p. 1120.

11.  See, e.g., Scheppele, “Small Emergencies,” pp. 845-847: Statutes like IEEPA show “that emergencies have been brought inside the constitutional order by being normalized in the ordinary legislative process.”